The End of an Environmental Controversy

The largest private sector industrial unit in Kerala—the Birla Group`s Gwalior Rayons factory at Mavoor—was formally shut down on 30 June 2001. The terms of closure of the factory, which had stopped its production in May 1999 following extensive anti-pollution agitations against it, were finalised in a meeting of the management and trade unions, in the presence of Kerala`s labour minister. The agreement specified the details of the compensatory package for the factory employees and stipulated a time-bound payment of these benefits. This was the end of the biggest ever environmental controversy related to water and air pollution in the state by an industrial unit, which was closely intertwined with labour and livelihood issues.

The pulp and paper factory of Gwalior Rayons (which was later renamed Grasim Industries—GI) was established in 1958 in Mavoor, about 20 km from Calicut on the banks of the Chaliyar river. The fact that the state could attract investment from Birlas was considered an achievement of the then communist-led government. To attract the big business house, the government had agreed to supply bamboo and reeds for the factory from the state`s rich reserve forest regions, at the incredibly low rate of one rupee per ton!  However, the thrill of entry of the industrial major did not last for long, and the factory became the centre of an intense environmental controversy from its early days.

Industrial Pollution and Endangered Livelihoods

Soon after the commencement of its operations in 1963, environmental pollution from GI became a burning issue. The pollutants discharged by the factory into the Chaliyar were contaminating its water, affecting the health and livelihoods of hundreds of people in Mavoor and nearby villages. Further to this, the emissions from GI caused large-scale air pollution, unleashing fatal diseases.

The water and air pollution caused by GI was so grave that it put life on the banks of Chaliyar in deep peril. The river soon turned dark with waste, leading to the deaths of hundreds of villagers and wrecking the health of many more. The death rate due to cancer skyrocketed in the locality and the area was reported to be under the grip of other life-threatening illnesses such as asthma, tuberculosis and cardio-pulmonary diseases. During 1991-95, more than 200 cancer deaths occurred in and around Mavoor and several hundred people in the locality underwent treatment for cancer alone. In 1999, as many as 29 deaths out of 136 (21 per cent) in the register of Vazhakkad Panchayat, a major pollution-affected village, were due to cancer. 

The pollutants discharged by the factory wiped out the aquatic life of the river, endangering the livelihoods of thousands of traditional workers (many times more than those employed in the factory), who were engaged in fishing, sand mining, mussel collection and the collection of minor forest produce. A study conducted by the University of Calicut with the Department of Science and Technology found the water pollution in Chaliyar to be alarming high. It revealed that the contents of lead, mercury and chromium in the river water were far above the tolerable limits.

All these sent alarm signals to environmentalists and social pressure groups, which intervened in the matter. In the 1960s and 1970s the people of Mavoor and nearby panchayats organised a series of protests demanding that the management follow environmental safety norms that would protect the health and livelihoods of population living around GI. Despite this mounting protest, the GI management continued production, discharging massive volumes of pollutants into the river and injurious smog, flouting the safety norms of the State Pollution Control Board and even directives of courts, which had to intervene from time to time.

In 1979, through mass action, the agitators destroyed a bund at Elamaram, which helped the GI management to acquire a steady supply of non-polluted water for the factory, whereas over a lakh people staying on the banks of the river were experiencing acute difficulties related to drinking and bathing water. This incident got immediate response not only from the management but also from the district and state authorities, as the resultant influx of polluted water even affected the intake point for the water supply scheme of Calicut Municipal Corporation. These initial struggles saw the overwhelming participation by most of the political parties and trade unions in the locality, besides environmental pressure groups.

Lockout of 1985-88 and its Consequences

In order to assure continued employment to about 3,000 workers in GI, the state government had to repeatedly yield to recurring and fresh demands for raw material by the management. In this process, GI destroyed much of the lush bamboo forests in the state. Large tracks of natural forests were laid to waste, besides converting thousands of hectares of tropical forests into industrial monoculture plantations. By the 1980s, because the government could not any longer satisfy the recurring demands for raw material, the firm had import raw material from neighbouring states. The increased burden of these imports on production costs was, however, quickly shifted to the employees by freezing salaries and stopping annual bonus payments. The resultant stagnation in pay and the deteriorating working conditions led to a series of labour unrest in the firm, and eventually to a shutdown in 1985.

The factory remained closed for nearly three-and-a-half years and this was the hardest time for the workers. The lockout period saw numerous suicides around Mavoor. Some of the workers moved to the Gulf countries in search of jobs but many were left with no alternative employment opportunities. Ultimately, the then government had to again appease the management to reopen the factory, by offering more concessions that resulted in further depletion of forest resources in the state. In this round of negotiation, the management successfully bargained to get the raw material at a shamefully lower price (which was less than 50 per cent of the pre-lockout period), for a minimum period of 5 years. By the time the factory was reopened in 1988 after the lockout, practically the entire forest tract of the state was made available for the ruthless plunder of the industrial unit.

The management found the lockout beneficial for bridling the activities of the factory trade unions; the latter had to agree that they would not go on a strike for five years, beginning October 1988, as a precondition for reopening the factory. Moreover, the management inflicted a dent in the solidarity of the activists in the anti-pollution agitation, by tactically linking the matter to the employment question of the workers employed in the factory.

Conflicting Interests and Convoluted Strategies

When GI reopened after the prolonged and miserable period of the lockout, the trade unions were forced to take a blatantly antagonistic stand against the environmental movement. After a prolonged period of miseries during lockout, the workers and trade unions of the factory feared that any support given to the mass movement against pollution would lead to another closure. Thus, by using the employment issue of workers in the factory, the management successfully broke the mass movement for livelihood and health issues of thousands of local residents. The divide between the trade unions and the movement increased in the following years. For instance, while the anti-pollution activists were vehemently waging protests citing the increased incidence of cancer in the locality, the local trade unions were actively campaigning against the claim that the incidence of cancer was related to the pollution from the factory. In a nutshell, during this period, the trade unions attached more priority to the employment concerns of the workers in the factory, neglecting the crucial and long-term issue of the lives and the livelihoods of lakhs of people living on the banks of the Chaliyar.

Through shrewd manipulation and dramatic twisting of issues, the GI management retained  control over the matter and continued to operate the unit amidst mounting, anti-pollution protests. To delay the observance of environmental safety measures, the management was found dragging its feet on issues related to raw material scarcity or by taking up the matter with the trade unions, posing a threat of lockout. This strategy of shifting of the foci of the issues was used till the ultimate closure of the factory in May 1999, in the wake of intensive pollution-related agitations. In August 1999, the management served a closure notice, under section 25 (O) of the Industrial Disputes Act, 1947, citing the inability of the government to provide the promised quantity and quality of raw material as the reason! However, the state government rejected the same as well as a subsequent review petition, and the matter was under consideration of the Industrial Tribunal, at the time of the final settlement in 2001. Meanwhile, the management also made an unsuccessful attempt to hand over the unit to another company; this was jointly resisted by the government and the trade unions. As per the closure agreement, all cases pending against the management were withdrawn, facilitating the shutting down of the factory.

Years after the formal closure of the factory, there are lingering resentments that the polluter was given a clean chit to exit, without paying any compensation for the damages inflicted to the river Chaliyar, the natural forests and to the health and livelihoods of people in the vicinity.

(Major References:  Seethi, K.M (2000): Cleaning Chaliyar River, Pollution Control or Jobs?, Economic and Political Weekly, January 15; Seethi, K.M (2001): Grasim: Polluter Does not Pay, Economic and Political Weekly, July 21; and George, Abey and Krishnan, Jyoti (2002): River, People and Industry: The Politics and Pollution of River Chaliyar, Report Submitted to Kerala Research Programme on Local Level Development, Centre for Development Studies, Thiruvananthapuram)