Having moved the required legislation after much procrastination, the government is finally implementing the employment guarantee promised in the National Common Minimum Programme. Notwithstanding the fact that the current scheme promises only a hundred days of employment per rural household and a wage of only Rs 60 a day, and is initially being implemented only in 200 districts, this is indeed a major first step.

But we should not forget that powerful sections in the current government had, on neo-liberal economic grounds, resisted the scheme for long, based on a number of specious grounds. In particular, there were three “financial” arguments that were advanced. First, that the public resources required for implementing the EGA are so large that the entire scheme is simply unaffordable and unsustainable. Second, that in any case such public money is better spent directly on large infrastructural investments that would directly assist economic growth. Third, that this is just throwing money away because of the large leakages in the delivery system, which would ensure that the intended beneficiaries will receive only a small proportion of the money that is spent. That the resistance based on these arguments is specious, diversionary and unsustainable has been demonstrated elsewhere, and need not detain us here. Such resistance has also been overtaken by events. What matters, however, is that among those who strongly espoused these arguments were important decision-makers who are still in power.

Having had to submit to pressure and accept and implement the scheme, many of those who advocated these arguments have changed tune and now describe the programme as one of the “flagship” schemes of the government, representing its “compassionate” face. Let us leave aside the fact that employment is a livelihood “right” of the citizen and not something to receive as a “give away” from modern-day feudals. This change of heart may be sheer deceit. The track record of the current government and the dominance in it of neo-liberal ideologues (who justify tax breaks for the rich while invoking fiscal prudence when it comes to delivering on the rights of the poor) give cause to believe that behind the “human face” lies the same agenda. If so, it would be interested in killing rather than implementing the scheme.

The first sign that the government may still be dragging its feet, even in the “pilot” districts, is the inadequate allocation of resources for the scheme in Budget 2006-07. Estimates of how much the scheme would cost have no doubt varied from Rs 25,000 crores a year to Rs 60,000 crores or more. Picking a figure like Rs 45,000 crores and allowing for the fact that the scheme is being implemented in about a third of the districts in the country, would place the estimate of resources required for the first year at Rs 15,000 crores. In addition, recognising that these are the most backward districts where the demand for employment offered by the scheme would be higher, this figure needs to be hiked to around Rs 20,000 crores. But the budget provides for just Rs 11,400 crores for the fiscal 2006-07.

It could be argued that the lower allocation is based on a more reasonable estimate of the number who would opt for employment under the scheme. But preliminary evidence seems to suggest that this view is unwarranted. In fact, even in relatively more developed States, such as Andhra Pradesh, the response to the scheme has reportedly been overwhelming. It is in the more backward States, for example, Bihar, that the demand is yet moderate or meagre. Sheer lack of information seems to explain at least some of the poor response. The bureaucratic process which prospective beneficiaries have to go through to acquire the much-coveted “job card” that monitors employment provision or “offtake” seems to be the other. Such bureaucratic processes, designed on the grounds of preventing leakages, foster new “barriers to entry” for prospective beneficiaries, even where information exists. For example, observers in Jharkhand have reported complaints that the need for photographs of eligible family members for submission of applications has created a new avenue for profiteering, with touts demanding up to Rs 100 for a single photograph. The government clearly can resolve these problems. But will it?

It cannot be denied that some monitoring of government programmes such as these is crucial. The experience with the Maharashtra Employment Guarantee Scheme, on which the NREGP is modelled, points to the inevitability of problems of the following kind: (1) lack of transparency in employment and cash disbursement; (2) fudging of muster rolls; (3) delayed payments; (4) cheating of illiterate villagers, with payments being denied under spurious grounds; and (5) lack of flexibility regarding work time. Dealing with such problems requires creating mechanisms that ensure scrutiny. But such scrutiny, the Maharashtra EGS teaches us, should not result in over-dependence upon the bureaucracy and increased rigidity in implementation.

Further, it should be obvious that many of the problems being already experienced with the NREGP arise because of the stipulation that the amount of employment provision be restricted to 100 days per rural “household”. This requires two levels of monitoring ensuring that not more than 100 days of employment is availed of and making sure that this applies to all individuals in a household.

This suggests that the 100-days-per-household rule could hamper the implementation of a scheme, which now almost all concerned declare to be virtuous. Advancing the EGA agenda required scrapping that rule. However, the neo-liberals resisted that on the grounds that it would entail unsustainable expenditure. But is this merely a ruse? Was the aim one of creating hurdles in the implementation of the scheme, which would then go the way of many other programmes that are noted in the budget but not implemented on the ground?

There is another such similar problem with the framework of the programme: that it is to be financed by the Centre but implemented by the States, which will be immediately responsible. What happens if the Centre does not transfer resources under this head of expenditure before the requirements arise? Since the States are known to be facing a fiscal crisis, this had generated a demand that they should in the circumstance have the right to lending from the Reserve Bank of India, the interest costs of which should be borne by the Centre. But given the neo-liberal theology that we need an “independent” central bank delinked from meeting the fiscal needs of the government, this option was foreclosed. Would then the States have to foot the bill for an unemployment dole or face censure? And would that be another roadblock to forsake the scheme?

These are the uncertainties that threaten the viability of the programme as it stands, and not the specious argument of a lack of resources. Fortunately, there are signs that mass organisations, NGOs and concerned citizens are mobilising to both ensure that the scheme is implemented and that its performance is monitored. Hopefully, they will win out in the end.