Babu P. Remesh is Associate Fellow, V.V. Giri National Labour Institute, and Coordinator, Integrated Labour History Research Programme & Archives of Indian Labour. Email: neetbabu@rediffmail.com. (Babu P. Remesh)
1982: A Strike Story
In the history of industrial conflicts in
Taking advantage of the provisions of the Bombay Industrial Relations Act (BIRA) of 1946, the Bombay Mill Owners’ Association was negotiating only with a monopoly trade union, Rashtriya Mill Mazdoor Sangh (RMMS), which had a weak worker backing. By the 1980s, there was growing skepticism among a majority of textile workers in
On 30 October, Datta Samant announced the formation of a new union for textile workers, the Maharashtra Girni Kamgar Union (MGKU) and urged the mill owners to announce a new agreement to avoid indefinite strike. Within the next few months, he emerged as the undisputed leader of the textile workers in
A few days before the commencement of the indefinite strike, Datta Samant appealed for a one-day strike on 6 January 1982. The strike had the widespread backing of the workers, despite an open appeal from the President of RMMS to the workers to not take part in the stopping of work. The overwhelming success of this one-day strike testified to the undisputed popularity and acceptance of MGKU among the textile workers.
The Strike and its Impact
The period prior to the strike was characterised by a marked deterioration of working conditions, low wages and exploitation under badli (contract) work. Accordingly, the demands of the strike included a rise in wages and improvements in the conditions of employment. The monthly wage increase sought ranged from Rs 200 to 400, with a bonus claim of 20 per cent. The other claims included regularisation of the jobs of badli workers, provision of allowances towards leave travel, house rent and so on. Along with a wage increase, the MGKU also demanded that the government scrap the Bombay Industrial Act, 1946, and de-recognise the monopoly official union status of RMMS.
The Mill Owners’ Association of Bombay rejected all the economic demands and viewed them as totally unacceptable. The mill owners pointed out that even the central government did not want them to yield, because it would lead to undesirable repercussions in other sectors (for example, ports and docks) and industrial regions. The state government of
The strike commanded massive worker support, despite the blatant and continued opposition from the RMMS, the Mill Owners’ Association, and the state and central governments. The Mill Owners’ Association and the state government used several pressure tactics to break the strike. In an attempt to force the agitators back to work unconditionally, the owners immediately followed the strike call with a lockout. Further, the workers’ wages for the month of January, already earned before the declaration of the strike and the lock out, were illegally withheld. The government closed all doors for conciliation and resolution, which made resolving the strike a distant possibility.
The majority of the workers continued their struggles against all economic odds. Even after six months of suffering, only 7 per cent of the total textile workforce had resumed work. Nevertheless, the workers could not continue with the hardships for so long and, in the absence of any forums for effective social dialogue, the strike gradually lost its momentum. Though the strike was never officially called off, its failure was widely acknowledged by July 1983.
The strike of 1982 resulted in massive layoffs, amounting to nearly 75,000 jobs lost. Many of the entrepreneurs also used the strike as a justification for closing down their mills or declaring them sick, with an agenda of reassigning their prime land for more profitable ventures. The strike also led to the migration of the textile mill industry from the city. By mid-1980s, several of the mills had moved outside
Datta Samant: A Unique Trade Unionist
The most influential personality in the
Samant’s growing popularity among the workers, and his adamant positions while leading the struggle earned him a label of a ‘militant’ trade unionist. Datta Samant grew as a prominent INTUC leader and turned increasingly radical in his political convictions and activism. Notwithstanding this, labour historians such as Hubert van Wersch explain that the ‘militant’ image attached to the leader and his union was a bit exaggerated. Although, the strike turned out to be a failure, Samant continued to mesmerise the working class in Mumbai. His victory as an independent candidate to the Lok Sabha in 1984 substantiates this. The saga of Samant attained yet another dimension, when he was fired upon and killed by unidentified assassins, again on a mid-January morning – just two day’s prior to the observance of 15th anniversary of the historic beginning of 1982 strike.
Despite its relative failure, the
(Major Sources: Hubert W. M. van Wersch (1992) Bombay Textile Strike: 1982-83, Oxford University Press, Bombay; Salim Lakha (1986): Organised Labour and Militant Unionism: The Textile Workers’ Strike of 1982, Bulletin of Concerned Asian Scholars, Vol. 20)`